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Abstract
Due to China’s geographic and human-exacerbated water scarcity, government leaders
have turned to the South to North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP) in order to ensure a reliable
source of water for the country’s increasingly parched Northern cities and townships. This thesis
examines this inter-basin water transfer project (soon to be the world’s largest) through the lens
of how government actors have framed the project. This official framing analysis is presented in
tandem with citizen perceptions observed through online commentary in order to evaluate how
effective such framing has been. Through such analysis, this research observes a pattern of
nationalism and utilitarianism within state framing which is largely echoed in citizen
commentary.

Keywords: China, politics, inter-basin water transfer, water scarcity, framing, sustainability
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Chapter I- Introduction
China has historically struggled to access and control its water. In the past, China’s most
significant water issues lay in unpredictable flooding. Today, while the threat of flooding still
looms large, it has largely been surpassed in significance by issues of water scarcity. China’s per
capita water resources are seventy-two percent lower than the global average, and well within the
margin to be classified as a water-scarce nation. Additionally, these scant per capita water
resources are unevenly distributed throughout China, and do not coordinate with the distribution
of population clusters or agricultural land. Southern China holds eighty-one percent of the
country’s water resources and fifty-four percent of the country’s population. By contrast,
Northern China holds only nineteen percent of the country’s water resources with forty-six
percent of the country’s population.1
China has adopted various environmental and infrastructural projects to alleviate the
pressure on existing water resources and expand access to clean drinking water in the North.
These include intensive groundwater extraction, rainwater catchment, expanding water reuse
capacity, and even desalination of sea water in some coastal areas. Although these approaches
mitigated some of the most severe effects of water scarcity, they have not been able to provide
long-term or large-scale relief. As a result, starting in December of 2002, the central government
began constructing the South to North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP). This water transfer
project consists of three main routes, the East Route, Middle Route, and West Route, and will
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eventually be the world’s largest water transfer project, with the goal of transferring 44.8 billion
cubic meters of water.2
The first completed route of the SNWDP is the Eastern Route (ER), which runs 1467 km
and consists of thirty-four large pumping stations. The ER was completed relatively swiftly, as it
utilizes pre-existing sections of the Grand Canal. The ER supplies water to Jiangsu, Anhui,
Shandong, Hebei and Tianjin. This route can transfer nearly 9 billion m3 per year of water, with
the potential for this figure to rise to as much as 14.8 billion m3 per year by 2030.3
The second completed route of the SNWDP is the Middle Route (MR). The MR brings
water to Beijing and Tianjin as well as the provinces of Henan and Hebei in the North China
Central Plain. The MR diverts 9.3 billion m3 of water per year from an expanded Danjiangkou
Reservoir to the North through a series of canals that flow mostly through gravity, and without
major pumping stations.4 Similar to the ER, there are plans to expand the current structure to
allow for the annual transport of 13 billion m3 of water per year.5
The Western Route Project (WR) is the final and most ambitious of the three sections.
The WR aims to relieve water shortages in Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region by diverting water from the upper Yangtze River.6 This
section, which has yet to be commenced, necessitates the construction of dammed reservoirs on
three of the largest tributaries of the Yangtze as well as a complex system of tunnels and will
require extensive pumping. Despite the difficulty required for this section of the SNWDP, it has
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remained a crucial component to the achievement of the goals of the SNWDP as a whole, as it is
believed that the WR could transfer an additional 17 billion m3 of transferred water.
As with any large-scale national infrastructure project, there is a significant component of
state framing which must be used to inform the public of the project’s benefits and justify the
state’s decision making. In the case of the SNWDP, this is especially true due to the high cost,
negative environmental impacts, and potentially inadequate nature of the project. This thesis
analyzes the complex relationship between the justifications and framing techniques utilized by
Chinese policymakers in implementing the SNWDP, and how such framing has impacted the
public opinion.
Framing refers to the phrases and themes which most frequently accompany government
descriptions and online commentary. The concept of “frames” or “framing,” especially observed
through “frame analysis,” is well-established within studies of public policy. In their analysis of
framing as a methodology for studying contemporary policy-making, Hulst and Yanow write,
“In policy-making, framing is a process in and through which policy-relevant actors
intersubjectively construct the meanings of the policy-relevant situations with which they are
involved, whether directly or as onlookers and stakeholders.”7 In short, framing is used to
condense a set of metaphors, catchphrases, images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices
into a comprehensive unit shaped and controlled by the political elite in order to influence how
the public understands an issue.8 In this thesis, framing analysis allows for the identification of
strategies used by government officials and their influence on perceptions every-day citizens.

Van Hulst, et al. "From Policy “Frames” to “Framing”: Theorizing a More Dynamic Political
Approach,” 97.
8
Gamson, et al. "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist
Approach."
7
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Britt Crow-Miller, in her article “Discourses of Deflection: The Politics of Framing
China’s South-North Water Transfer Project” identifies a framing tactic of depoliticizing the
project, which allows the state, through the SNWDP, to advance its “ultimate goal of
maintaining the high economic growth rates that underpin its continued legitimacy.”9 Judith
Shapiro and Li Yifei in their research on environmental policy making in China align themselves
with Crow-Miller’s analysis in identifying an “authoritarian environmentalism” through which
the state monopolizes environmental knowledge and power in order to further the aims of the
state.10 It does this by framing its environmental policy decisions as in step with public desires,
while giving little autonomy to individual citizens. This thesis fuses the work of Crow-Miller and
Shapiro by expanding Crow-Miller’s discourse analysis of the SNWDP with an understanding of
Shapiro and Li’s “authoritarian environmentalism.”
Understanding how the state has framed the SNWDP and its efficacy in shaping public
perception is important in light of two important historic events within China in the past thirty
years. The first is the construction and subsequent backlash against the Three Gorges Dam.
Many Chinese citizens, scientists, and journalists objected to the construction of the Three
Gorges Dam due to its social, environmental, and cultural impacts. Even within the CCP, many
were torn about the rationale of the project, as seen by the unprecedented number of delegates to
the National People’s Congress who in 1992 voted against or abstained from voting to begin
construction of the dam. When construction finally began in 1993, objection to the project turned
international, resulting in a public relations crisis for the PRC as information on the jailing and
silencing of dissidents became global knowledge.

9
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The second historic event which motivates this research is the rise of China’s
environmental movement. Andrew Mertha, in his book China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action
and Policy Change argues that recent environmental issues have galvanized large-scale public
responses from citizens, NGOs, and the media, and led to an increasingly pluralized process of
environmental decision making.11 In his book The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China,
Bryan Tilt concurs with Mertha’s perception of citizen sustainability action in China on a
number of points, however, Tilt goes further in identifying an emergent environmental civil
society which utilizes the words, actions, and limitations of the state to cautiously advocate for
environmental protection. This form of “rightful resistance” exists within the parameters set by
the government and invokes the rhetoric of the government itself.12
In light of both the history of vocal opposition to the Three Gorges Dam and a rise in
environmental consciousness, the construction and maintenance of the SNWDP presents an apt
window into current Chinese environmental policy making and framing. Understanding how the
state has been able to frame the project and the effectiveness of framing in order to garner
support has important implications as nations throughout the world increasingly find themselves
in the same position as China—balancing a growing population and declining natural resources.
In order to address the research question of this thesis, I have conducted a framing analysis
of official rhetoric of the SNWDP as a whole as well as within the case study cities of Beijing
and Tianjin. I have also conducted a framing analysis of Zhihu postings by Chinese citizens
regarding the SNWDP. By comparing these perspectives, this thesis sheds light on the ways in
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which the state most frequently frames the project in order to garner support and the framing
tactics which have proven most effective in influencing public sentiment.
Based on an analysis of government documents and Zhihu microblog postings, I argue
that, in order to foster public support for the SNWDP, the state has relied upon utilitarian and
neo-nationalist framing devices. Utilitarianism is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as
“the doctrine that an action is right insofar as it promotes happiness, and that the greatest
happiness of the greatest number should be the guiding principle of conduct.” Thus, the
SNWDP, whose beneficiaries number in the hundreds of millions, is continually praised by the
state for its invaluable contribution to the progress of China.
This utilitarian emphasis of SNWDP framing is exemplified most notably by numerous
of official statements and online posting enumerating its beneficiaries. Such headlines are eyecatching, overtly supportive of the project, and represent a quantitative metric for evaluating the
project while ignoring many of its negative impacts. Furthermore, utilitarian framing explains the
support for the project despite what many have described as an “inadequate solution.” Although
the SNWDP has provided much needed water to Northern, drought-prone areas, it has by no
means solved China’s alarming water resource issues. Even in cities such as Beijing and Tianjin,
the poster children for the success of the SNWDP, per capita water resources remain below
international standards for scarcity. Utilitarianism framing, however, allows the state to support
the SNWDP despite its inability to fully resolve the crisis it was intended to combat.
Utilitarianism can best foster support for a project when the benefits and shortcomings of
the project are understood/imagined as existing within a single entity—in this case, mainland
China. Why else would residents living along the Danjiangkou Reservoir care about the number
of beneficiaries in Northern China? The answer lies in the emergence of neo-nationalism, which

9

allows the South to see Northern benefits and beneficiaries as not entirely separate from
themselves. Thus, a second framing theme emerges within the state’s dialogue surrounding the
SNWDP, which emphasizes the unity of the state as a whole, the importance of Beijing as a
historic city and national capital, and the creation of a modern, developed society tied to
President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.”
Peter Gries in his book China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy,
understands nationalism in China as evolving in dynamic relationship with other nations and the
past. Chinese nationalism is thus ever-changing, intersubjective, and rejects simplification. As it
relates to the content of this thesis, Gries asserts that Chinese neo-nationalism is rooted in both
projecting China’s capability and modernization on a global scale while at the same time
drawing upon the “victimization narrative of Chinese suffering at the hand of Western
Imperialists.”13 This echoes Judith Shapiro’s assertion of a Chinese “Superiority Inferiority
Complex,” discussed at length in the following chapter.
These utilitarian and neo-nationalist framing devices identified within official discourse
have proven largely effective in garnering support for or at least tacit acceptance of the project.
Although online posts by Chinese citizens contain a much more robust account of the
shortcomings and negative impacts of the project than official sources, disapproval is often
tempered by or buried beneath an understanding of the many beneficiaries of the project who the
writers of these posts identify with and sympathize for. Despite their willingness to criticize
certain aspects of the SNWDP, online users fall in line with many of the utilitarian frames and
neo-nationalist sentiments of the state.

13
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Chapter II- Official Framing of the South to North Water Diversion Project
It is neither a profound statement nor an indictment of the Chinese state to argue that a
significant amount of misleading positive framing accompanies the policies created and
promulgated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Issue framing is inherent to the political
process. All states, whether democratic or authoritarian, emphasize positive outcomes while
omitting or minimalizing negative outcomes. Although the line between framing and propaganda
is rather blurred, for the sake of clarity and consistency, I will refer to this process as framing.
In order to understand the frames utilized by the CCP, this chapter divides official
discussions of the SNWDP into two over-arching framing categories—Economics and
Development, and Environmental Sustainability. Each of these categories will include a number
of individual frames as well as their underlying motivations.
Methodologically, this chapter is based on framing analysis, through which reoccurring
themes and their underlying meanings are extrapolated. I applied this methodology to fifty key
government documents published between 2001 and 2020 that involve the SNWDP. The
findings of this framing analysis will depict the discourses, incentives, and themes which the
CCP has relied upon in order to craft a palatable narrative around a costly project with significant
economic, environmental, and social implications.

Economics & Development
Within the framing category of economics and development, I have identified two
categories of emphasis—economic growth and social benefits. Economic benefits, at least at the
onset of the project, were the most frequent. The reliance on economic framing of the SNWDP is
based on two important economic and political factors. The first factor is the post-Tiananmen
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(1989) reliance on accelerating economic growth which likely motivated the proposal and
approval of the project. The second factor is the post-2016 economic slowdown and the party’s
efforts to maintain the economic growth which had solidified their legitimacy over the past forty
years.
Following the Tiananmen Massacre (1989), the CCP found itself in a highly contentious
political position. The deaths of hundreds of protestors at the hands of the state shocked the
Western world, and China was criticized as a ruthless authoritarian state. The ensuing sanctions
resulted in a precipitous dip in economic growth in 1989 that lasted until 1991. However, China
bounced back quickly, even making up for lost time by 1992.
In fact, the growth following 1992 ushered in some of the China’s strongest years of
economic growth. Many scholars point to the Tiananmen Square Massacre as a turning point in
Chinese economic policy, which lent urgency and legitimacy to powerful elites’ mobilizing of
resources for economic development. The post-Tiananmen phase of State Capitalism was
explicitly growth oriented, accompanied by abrupt increases in public investment and provision
of public goods.14 This focus on growth oriented economics required constantly increasing levels
of production, a difficult task to accomplish with diminishing water availability, and a sure
impetus for the initial proposal and approval of the construction of the SNWDP in the early
2000s.
The resulting economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, brought
literacy and health care even to China’s most remote provinces, and ultimately allowed for the
continued legitimacy of CCP rule, even as it has largely moved away from the ideological purity
of the Mao years. However, as with any period of economic boom, a bust is sure to follow.

14
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Between 2014 and 2019, the average annual GDP growth rate diminished to 6.85 percent.15
Though 6.85 percent GDP growth rate by no means spells imminent economic collapse, it does
seem to indicate that China’s years of 15 percent (1984) and 14 percent (1992, 2007) annual
GDP growth is perhaps a thing of the past.
This gradual slowing of Chinese economic growth, particularly following the 2008 global
financial crisis, has prompted calls for sustainable development, or at the very least a more
balanced, service-oriented, technologically advanced stage of development. However, as Beijing
navigates the tumultuous path of transitioning away from economic growth rooted in
manufacturing, low-wage labor, and environmental degradation, it is inevitable that money and
economic opportunity will be lost within some sectors of the Chinese economy. Rising
unemployment and slowing rates of economic growth, have shaken the confidence of the
Chinese people in their economy, causing, some to worry about the legitimacy of continued CCP
authority. Given this context—the steady economic slowdown and the worries that the CCP
leadership is unfit to handle it—it is unsurprising that the most frequently-used framing of the
SNWDP would be one which assuages national fears of economic slowdown.
This propensity for economic framing is well exemplified in the 2003 document,
“Expected Benefits of the South to North Water Transfer Project.” In this official statement, the
Chinese Ministry of Water Resources states three specific categories of benefits—social
benefits, economic benefits, and ecological benefits. Social benefits include the availability of
safe drinking water. Economic benefits include the ability to increase agricultural yields as well
as industrial production, which would purportedly create 500,000-600,000 jobs per year, and
boost the Chinese economy by 0.2-0.3 percent per year. Ecological benefits include the ability to

15
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alleviate overexploitation of groundwater, increased water flow in receiving area waterways, and
increased ability for “sustainable economic and social development.”16
What is interesting about these points is that within each category, whether social,
economic, or ecological, the benefits are ultimately rooted in economic development/growth.
Ecological benefits, though described as helping to restore the natural environment and creating
resilience against climate change, are summarized as allowing for a development path which
would sustain the economic growth China is currently pursuing. Social benefits such as the
expansion of reliable clean water are summarized as increasing the potential for individual
economic opportunities.
This pattern, through which the expected and observed benefits of the SNWDP are each
rooted in economic outcomes is observed throughout government documents, government-run
newspapers, and speeches by party leaders. In a Xinhua news article published in 2013, Huang
Shaoan, a scholar of the Yangtze River and the dean of the Economic Research Institute of
Shandong University is quoted “the east route of the South-to-North Water Diversion will enable
the optimal allocation of water resources from the North to the South and inject new vitality into
the development of the North and South.”17
In a speech made in November 2019, Premier Li Keqiang stated that the shortage and
uneven distribution of water resources is one of the main forces impeding the economic
development of North and Northwest China. He goes on to say that improvement to the SNWDP
will allow China to overcome the current downward economic pressure, stimulate investment,

Ministry of Water Resources, "Nánshuǐběidiào gōngchéng de yùqí xiàoyì" [Expected benefits
of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project].”
17
“Zhōngguó nánshuǐběidiào dōng xiàn gōngchéng tōng shuǐ zònghé xiàoyì tūxiǎn”
[Comprehensive benefits of water supply in the East Route of China's South-to-North Water
Transfer Project].
16
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increase employment, and stabilize economic growth. These specific points, with the notable
inclusion of increased agricultural and industrial productivity, represent the economic benefits
most often stated by official sources.18
Of these established economic frames, the ability to mitigate slowing economic growth
(i.e. downward economic pressure) is in many ways a larger category under which all other
economic benefits fall. The SNWDP’s ability to increase employment, agricultural output and
industrial output, while also allowing urban centers to expand can each be understood as an
appeal to the economic needs of a diverse citizenry.
On the whole, the SNWDP aims to benefit Northern Chinese urbanites. According to The
Ministry of Water Resources website, titled “Main Water Supply Objects of the SNWDP”
explicitly identifies cities as its main supply targets because of their concentrated population,
severe water shortage, and rapid economic and social development.
As the chasm of economic opportunities and basic living standards between the coastal
urban elites and interior rural residents expands, China finds itself caught between the economic
needs of two very different constituencies. While China’s urban centers continue to expand their
reaches, increase their population, and promote development, massive waves of rural to urban
migration have made many of China’s rural areas places of emptiness and neglect. Thus, if the
state is not careful in its framing, if rural residents view the project as an $80 billion water
transfer project built to satisfy the municipal water needs of urban residents, while millions of
rural farmers struggle to access clean water for their crops, the state would find itself in a
difficult situation with hundreds of millions of citizens.

“Lǐ Kèqiáng: Yǐ lìshǐ shìyě quánjú yǎnguāng móuhuà hé tuījìn nánshuǐběidiào hòuxù
gongcheng” [Li Keqiang: Planning and Advancing the Follow-up Project of the South-to-North
Water Diversion Project from a Historical Perspective]
18
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Economic benefits of the SNWDP are also closely tied to the social benefits of the
project, through the development potential that clean, reliable water brings. The most frequently,
even if also the most ambiguous, way in which social benefits are delineated is by quantifying
the number of beneficiaries. This practice is evident in headlines such as “SNWDP Middle Route
Projects has benefited more than 58.59 million people,” “Over 120 Million People have Directly
Benefited From the SNWDP on its 5th Anniversary,” and “South to North Water Diversion
Benefits 50 million Chinese.” The articles, however, remain ambiguous about which people
benefit or how they might benefit.
Another aspect of social benefit framing that is worth mentioning, is the way in which
social benefits are utilized in information surrounding displaced migrants. In a 2015 article
“South to North Water Diversion Work Has Entered a New Stage: Water Quality Preservation
and Livelihood Enhancement” published by People’s Daily, it states “After the relocation of
migrants from the Danjiangkou Reservoir Area of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project,
their basic living conditions have improved significantly compared to the past.”19 An article
published by Xinhua News in 2019 titled “Massive Water Diversion Project Proves Monumental
Effort” echoes this sentiment with a direct quote from a migrant who recalls his relocation
experience, “We finally bid farewell to the days when what we earned was only enough for food
and clothing.”20

Environmental Sustainability

Nánshuǐběidiào gōngzuò jìnrù xīn jiēduàn: Bǎo shuǐzhì, qiáng mínshēng” [South-to-North
Water Diversion Work has Entered a New Stage: Water Quality Preservation and Livelihood
Enhancement].
20
“Xinhua Headlines: Massive Water Diversion Project Proves Monumental Effort.”
19
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Over the last five years, framing emphasis on economic benefits has been superseded by
an emphasis on environmental benefits. When the SNWDP was proposed, during construction,
and even into the period of actual water transfer following the completion of the Eastern and
Middle Routes, party leaders, newspapers, and other official sources, discussed the SNWDP as a
project with sweeping economic benefits. This has shifted significantly in more recent official
sources to highlight the environmental benefits of the project.
There are two primary explanations for the shift in framing towards environmental
benefits. The first explanation is that the task of fostering support for construction and the task of
fostering support for continued maintenance require fundamentally different approaches, with
the latter necessitating a new emphasis on ecology. This explanation aligns with the fact that, in
the early stages of the project, before much was known about the SNWDP’s effectiveness or
negative effects, economic benefits provided a palatable, uncontroversial justification. Over time,
as the public came to interact more personally with the SNWDP, concerns about the destruction
of source area water ways and polluted canals became more apparent. This new concern that the
SNWDP’s ecological costs would outweigh its economic benefits necessitated a new focus on
extolling the project’s environmental benefits.
The second explanation for the rise in environmental framing, not mutually exclusive
from the first, is that during the time period in which China has proposed, constructed, and
maintained the SNWDP, public sentiment has shifted towards environmentalism.21 Even in
China’s most rural areas, environmental protests are on the rise as the negative effects of
pollution and water contamination become personally felt.22

21
22
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Since the late-1990s, China has built an environmental legal regime, elevated the
environmental protection bureau to ministerial status, and even codified environmentalism into
official state planning objectives through Xi Jinping’s “Ecological Civilization.”23 Although it
remains to be seen whether China will develop a meaningful environmental civil society in the
traditional sense—grass roots activism which challenges established institutions and actors—the
state has certainly sought to present itself as in-line with the environmental concerns of the
people. The recent framing of the SNWDP as a primarily environmental rather than economic
policy initiative fits this general pattern.
The framing of the SNWDP as an environmental infrastructure project highlights three
themes: Northern water scarcity, Northern ecological restoration, and pollution mitigation. In her
work analyzing the framing of the SNWDP, Britt Crow-Miller focuses on the “historicization of
northern water scarcity” through “naturalized narratives about water scarcity and the ecological
benefits of water transfer.”24 These naturalized narratives paint Northern China as a historically
arid geographic region, a point which, however accurate, ignores many of the anthropogenic
causes of that desertification.
Crow-Miller’s findings and analysis of naturalized narratives of water scarcity hold true.
Government documents, news articles, and speeches of party members underscore that the
aridity of the North is both a justification for the project and an appeal to its projected ecological
benefits. One article, published by Xinhua News in 2019 and titled “Massive Water Diversion
Project Proves Monumental Effort” states, “China’s densely-populated northern region has long
suffered acute water shortage.”25 Another Xinhua article published in 2020 leads with the
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prospect of a water scarce North with its title “Middle Route of China’s Water Project Boosts
Water Diversion to Parched North.”26 North China is interchangeably referred to as “parched,”
“dry,” “arid,” and “water-stressed.”27 The usage of these terms confers more than simply
geographic information, it also serves to justify the massive social and economic costs associated
with the SNWDP, while minimizing the space for meaningful opposition.
In an article published by People’s Daily, titled “Five Questions about the South to North
Water Diversion Project,” one question asks “Why is Southern water transferred to the North?”
In response, the article cites a number of commonly-reported statistics related to China’s water
consumption—Tianjin-Hebei residents only consume 1/9th of the nation’s per capita water
consumption rates, with 70 percent coming directly from groundwater. In light of these facts, the
article states, “Water transfer is our last resort.” Water scarcity justifies and validates the
government’s actions and spending to implement the SNWDP. By constructing the north as an
inherently, desperately water stressed place, the SNWDP is framed as an essential infrastructure
initiative. Many official documents published by the National Development and Reform
Commission, refer to the SNWDP as a “lifeline” for urban and rural Northern residents.
Another common framing of the ecological benefits of the SNWDP is the proposed usage
of “ecological water.” Ecological water refers to water utilized for conservation. Ecological
water can be used to replenish groundwater, as well as restore of dried rivers and depleted lakes.
In the 2005 document “Main Water Supply Objective of the SNWDP” published by the Ministry
of Water Resources and previously referenced in this chapter, gradually replenishing

“Middle Route of China’s Water Project Boosts Water Diversion to Parched North.”
“Factbook: China’s South to North Water Diversion Project”; “Implementation Opinions on
Pollution Control Planning of Eastern Route of the South to North Water Transfer Project” ;
“South to North Water Diversion Benefits 50 mln Chinese.”
26
27
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groundwater and improving ecological water use is identified as a primary goal of the project.28
The Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment frequently
praise the SNWDP’s contribution to rising groundwater levels.
In 2015, People’s Daily published an article titled “Beijing’s Groundwater Levels Rise
for the First Time in 16 Years, South to North Water Diversion is the Biggest Contributor.” This
article cites a number of impressive commitments undertaken by the Beijing Municipal Water
Affairs Bureau in order to combat excessive groundwater exploitation, including a
comprehensive and systematic approach to monitoring and recovery.29 In 2020, People’s Daily
published an update on the first-phase of the Middle Route of the SNWDP, enumerating many
aspects in which the project had exceeded expectations. Since its inception, the article states,
“the ecological water allocation was 2.403 billion cubic meters, which exceeded the annual plan
for groundwater overexploitation by 36.8 percent.30
Urban groundwater is not the only usage of SNWDP “ecological water.” The SNWDP
funnels water toward northern rivers, benefiting much more than urban residents. In the same
2020 People’s Daily article, it is stated that thirty-nine rivers along the route received water from
the SNWDP, greatly improving the livelihood of local residents. Seven separate documents cite
that the SNWDP is responsible for the replenishing of approximately thirty Chinese rivers. The
frequency with which the use of SNWDP water is used for explicitly environmental purposes

“Nánshuǐběidiào gōngchéng zhǔyào gōngshuǐ duìxiàng” [The Main Water Supply Objectives
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30
“Nánshuǐběidiào zhōngxiàn yī qí gōngchéng” [The First Phase of the Middle Route of the
South-to-North Water Transfer Project]
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strengthens the narrative of the project as means of addressing China’s myriad environmental
challenges.
The third and final component of the SNWDP’s environmental framing is pollution
mitigation. Pollution mitigation is categorically different from the aforementioned frames of
northern water scarcity and ecological restoration, in that pollution mitigation efforts are less a
benefit expected from the project than a rebuttal to a common concern of the project.
Transferring polluted water represents the single largest challenge acknowledged within
official SNWDP discourse. Although the documents never indicate a truly dire situation in terms
of the quality of the SNWDP’s water, the sheer frequency of instances in which pollutionmitigation efforts are mentioned indicates that this is likely a very significant barrier to the
project’s success.

Underlying Themes
Economics and development and environmental benefits represent the most easily
observable frames of the SNWDP, and it is through these frames, and their variant emphasis on
different components of the project, that we are able to extrapolate more subtle themes, which
taken together, convey important meanings regarding the overall narrative which surrounds the
SNWDP. Based on the sources analyzed for this research, the theme which appears most
frequently between the lines of the explicit framing of the SNWDP is one which fuses
nationalism and modernization.
The emphasis on nationalism, through a unified, cohesive national state, is important in
order to alleviate the animosity which might eventually result from the fact that the SNWDP is,
by and large, a project designed to benefit northern urbanites. Although there are certainly
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benefits derived from the project in rural areas along the route, the benefits of the project are felt
most fully within northern urban areas, such as Beijing and Tianjin. The emphasis on
nationalism, is also intended to combat the disproportionate negative impacts felt in source area
waterways. These negative impacts include destruction of wetlands, pollution, shutting down of
local industries prone to pollution, and displacement of residents. While the South bears the
brunt of the SNWDP’s negative impacts, it receives virtually none of its benefits.
Thus, nationalism of SNWDP framing is used to emphasize China as a collective whole,
the ways in which the North in other respects aids the South, and the pride the South should take
in its ability to aid the North, especially the capital city of Beijing. This nationalism makes
Northern water scarcity a national, rather than regional issue as the shortcoming of one region is
often tied to the slowed economic growth, degraded environment, and economic disparities of
the country as a whole. One way in which this is observed within discussions of the SNWDP is
through the project’s linkages to Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.”
The China Dream existed as a nebulous concept in China even prior to Xi Jinping’s
endorsement of the term. Though Xi’s China Dream incorporates a vast array of goals, it is
meant to inspire the Chinese people by emphasizing the current and past greatness of the Chinese
nation as well as the pursuit of future goals. This dream of national greatness, however, is
multifaceted. As Chinese political scholar David Kerr describes it, “The notion of the China
Dream is a clever negotiation between collective identity and individual aspirations. It is rather
like a large body of water—the dream reveals the Chinese people as having a collective will and
identity shaped by a difficult history, but at the same time if individuals and communities look

22

closely into the dream they should be able to see their own reflection in it.”31 Thus, the China
Dream, though ostensibly a forward-looking national program, is also largely a historicallybased initiative rooted in the national legacy of the Chinese state.
Judith Shapiro, in her book China’s Environmental Challenges, understands this point as
a “Crisis of Face,” or a “Superiority Inferiority Complex.” These points are based, similar to the
China Dream, on the dual national identity of the Chinese civilization as historically significant,
yet recently humiliated.32 As a result, China has expended great effort to prove itself as a
revitalized nation, more similar to its distant past and Middle Kingdom ethos than its recent
plights of poverty, corruption, and ecological degradation.
Another guiding principal of CCP policymaking which plays into the nationalist and
modernization framing of the SNWDP is Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development.” This
slogan, first appearing in 2003, incorporates sustainable development, social welfare, humancentered policy making, and aims to correct the unbalanced growth which characterized the
preceding decades.
The SNWDP fits neatly within the goals of both the China Dream and the Scientific
Outlook on Development as a project which not only improves the resource allocation of
millions, but also displays China’s ability to successfully construct one of the world’s most
impressive feats of geological engineering. Thus, much of the framing which emphasizes
development and modernization is identified through statements of the unique magnitude, cost,
or unprecedented nature of the project.
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On the Ministry of Water webpage devoted to the SNWDP, there is an entire category of
articles labeled “The Best of the Projects” (gongcheng zhi zui). Beneath this category, article
titles include the phrases: “One of the Largest Water Transfer Projects in the World,” “One of
the Longest Water Transfer Projects in the World,” “The World’s Most Beneficial Water
Transfer Project,” “The Largest Pumping Station Group in the World,” “The Largest Dam
Heightening Project,” and “The World’s Largest U-Shaped Water Conveyance Aqueduct
Project,” among others. A Xinhua News Article published in 2020 echoes this sentiment with the
statement, “The project leads the world with its length, population, and area benefited and the
size of a pumping station cluster along the eastern route, as well as having one of the world’s
largest water supply capacities.”33 These and other instances in which the SNWDP is framed as a
project with impressive metrics begs the question of if the SNWDP was truly initiated as a means
to meaningfully address northern water security or as a means of stoking nationalistic pride as a
result of the modernization and development potential displayed by the SNWDP.
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Chapter III- Model Cities of the SNWDP: A Case Study of Beijing and Tianjin
Understanding the framing of the South to North Water Diversion Project as a whole
provides invaluable insights into how the state has sought to highlight the project’s benefits to
the nation and deflect its shortcomings. In focusing only on the overarching picture, however,
one runs the risk of overlooking the localized challenges and opportunities for innovation which
in reality determine the success or failure of the project.
Beijing and Tianjin have been held up as prime examples of the SNWDP’s benefits. This
chapter highlights the specifics of the project in the cities which most fully utilize and depend
upon it. Although the SNWDP experiences of Beijing and Tianjin, as wealthy urban centers, are
not indicative of the experiences of all municipalities along the water transfer route, they do
provide avenues for the state to showcase the SNWDP as an infrastructure project capable of
combatting severe water scarcity.
In order to examine the SNWDP through Beijing and Tianjin usage, I introduce the
geographic and climactic conditions which have necessitated these cities’ reliance upon the
project. I then provide a brief overview of framing used by official publications of Tianjin and
Beijing.
The framing devices utilized by state-run sources of Beijing and Tianjin largely echo the
framing of the project as a whole. One key difference is that Beijing and Tianjin framing make
direct appeals to source area communities. The municipalities state their (usually monetary)
commitment to southern source area communities as a token of thanks for their “life-giving”
waters. Such phrasing is no doubt an appeal to nationalist sentiment and a strategy to diminish
the animosity with could potentially boil over from the unequal partnership between the
economically insignificant but resource rich source areas and economically and politically
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powerful but resource scarce northern cities. This framing thus seeks to bridge the gap between
the South and the North by promoting social unity within the nation as a whole.
Furthermore, the framing of Beijing and Tianjin’s reliance upon and usage of the
SNWDP is more thoroughly utilitarian than official framing of the project overall. Beijing and
Tianjin sources often emphasize the importance of the water for their many millions of citizens
over the negative or nonexistent impact on smaller, source area communities. This utilitarianism
is often rooted in nationalist sentiment which seeks to establish the importance of the country as
a whole even as it places more value on the water needs of Northern urban residents.

Current Water Situations of Beijing and Tianjin
When Beijing was first named the capital city of China during the Yuan Dynasty nearly
eight-hundred years ago few could have predicted the population explosion in the coming
centuries. Today, Beijing is home to 21 million residents, a fact which becomes even more
startling when considering the limited natural resource endowment upon which this mega-city
rests.
Beijing is located on the North China Plain, in a semi-arid climate zone. In the winter,
Beijing’s weather is dry and cold, a result of high-pressure systems rolling in from Mongolia. In
the summer, Beijing’s weather is warm and humid, a result of low-pressure systems from the
Pacific. Beijing’s annual precipitation is around 23 inches, however, this rainfall is unevenly
distributed over time. Between June and September, Beijing may receive up to 85 percent of its
annual rainfall. There have been instances of up to 30 percent of annual rainfall occurring in just
three days.34
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These geographic water issues are compounded by the rapid development of Beijing’s
economy, industry, and population, making water shortage issues increasingly severe. By the
early 2000s, water shortages had begun to curtail the continued growth and development of the
city. Not only had its per capita water resources fallen to 100 m3 (500 m3 is considered absolute
scarcity), but a prolonged draught between 1999 and 2007 forced Beijing to become increasingly
reliant on groundwater extraction.
Groundwater is used in cities across the globe in order to supplement surface water in
times of need, and can serve as a safety measure in times of severe drought. Continual extraction
of groundwater, especially if it outpaces natural replenishment, has negative geological effects
and creates increased vulnerability in case of future droughts. In Beijing, more than nearly any
city in the world, groundwater was over-exploited at dizzying rates. Between 2000 and 2014, the
Beijing Plain declined at a rate of ~0.7 m year−1 from 15 m below the ground surface to 26 m.
Sinking water tables, combined with changing precipitation patterns, and heightened climate
extremes indicated a worsening water situation in Beijing, as the city’s population and water
needs continued to expand.35
Beijing, however, is not alone in its rapid economic, industrial, and population growth
needs amidst a troubling water endowment. Tianjin, China’s third largest city by area and fourth
largest city by population, shares Beijing’s plight of ever-increasing demand for water despite
ever-dwindling sources. Although Tianjin does not command the international attention or
tourism of Beijing, Tianjin is a major manufacturing center and port city, making it crucial to
China’s continued economic growth and development.
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Tianjin is located along the Bohai Sea, just seventy-five miles southeast of Beijing. Like
Beijing, large portions of the year experience lack of rainfall, while rain that does come, usually
during the summer, is highly variant. Nearly 85 percent of annual rainfall occurs between June
and September, and there are instances of 40-70 percent of rainfall occurring within 3 days.
Though annual precipitation in Tianjin is 23.6 inches, this number can vary drastically from year
to year, typically in cycles of several consecutive dry years followed by several consecutive wet
years.36
As a result of Tianjin’s sparse rainfall, naturally dry climate, and rapid population
growth, the water resources of the city have been put under extreme stress. As of 2018, Tianjin’s
per capita water resources were 112 m3, well below international and national levels indicating
severe water scarcity. Over time, groundwater reserves have been depleted to make up for
unavailable surface water sources, resulting in severe land subsidence and rapidly declining
groundwater levels. Because of its coastal location, Tianjin has been able to experiment with
desalination technologies as an additional source of water. By 2015 Tianjin operated nine
desalination plants, and the total capacity reached 3.2 × 105 m3/d.37 However, in total, this figure
respresents only three percent of total water supply.38 Although desalination represents a further
avenue to combat water scarcity, largely unavailable to Beijing, the high cost energy inputs and
ecologically destructive byproducts of desalination, have kept it from being able to fully support
the water needs of Tianjin citizens.

Song et al., “Assessment of Water Resources Carrying Capacity in Tianjin City of China.”
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The SNWDP as a Potential Solution
Given the seemingly intractable water crises facing Beijing and Tianjin by the early
2000s, it comes as no surprise that the start of the South to North Water Diversion Project was
met with enthusiasm. Although both cities were already using transferred water from local rivers
and reservoirs in some capacity, the SNWDP would multiply many times over the percentage of
this dependable source of clean water.
As of November 2020, the amount of water transferred to Beijing via the SNWDP
reached 5.9 billion cubic meters since the beginning of water transfer. Of this, 3.883 billion cubic
meters was allocated as drinking water for residents, and 824 million cubic meters stored in
reservoirs such as Miyun and Huairou for environmental replenishment.39 By July of 2019,
Tianjin had received 4 billion cubic meters, 800 million of which has been used to replenish
depleted rivers and lakes.40 In total, SNWDP water comprises on average 71 percent of
municipal water usage in both cities.41
Beijing and Tianjin have served as models for the rest of the country and showcases for
the efficacy of the SNWDP. This quantity of water has had far reaching economic,
environmental, and social impacts for Beijing and Tianjin, as both cities are able to more
sustainably and confidently ensure that the basic water needs of residents are met. In official
sources from Beijing and Tianjin, SNWDP usage was most often framed in relation to economic,
environmental, and social benefits. The following sections of this chapter will analyze the major
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economic, environmental, and social impacts that the SNWDP has had on the Beijing and
Tianjin municipalities and what these points indicate about the justifications and motivations for
SNWDP usage in Beijing and Tianjin.

Economic Benefits
The introduction of millions of cubic meters of clean drinking water benefited the
economic growth and development of both the Beijing and Tianjin municipal areas. Most of
these effects occur through the trickle-down effects of water-secure citizens and water-secure
businesses which are better able to expand their economic influence than they would be under
conditions of water scarcity. In this way, the waters of the SNWDP act more as a springboard for
pre-existing economic activity than as a direct source of economic growth.
One example of these trickle-down economic benefits as a result of the SNWDP is the
rejuvenation of the Grand Canal. This canal, which has great economic significance to both
Beijing and Tianjin, has been able to accommodate larger ships with greater stability. After the
completion of the first phase of the Eastern Route, the section south of the Yellow River of the
Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal was made fully navigable from Dongping Lake to the Yangtze
River. The port throughput capacity will be increased by 1,350 tons, second only to the Yangtze
River, with crucial importance to the economies of Beijing and Tianjin.42
Economic benefits of the SNWDP for Beijing and Tianjin also include what is often,
vaguely, referred to as “sustainable development.” The term first entered the lexicon of policy
making strategies following the announcement of the United Nations Sustainable Development

“Jīngjì rìbào: Nánshuǐběidiào yǒulì zhīchēng shòu shuǐ qū hé shuǐyuán qū jīngjì shèhuì
fāzhǎn.” [Economic Daily: South-to-North Water Diversion strongly supports the economic and
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Goals in 2015. These goals were meant to provide a blueprint for cities, states, and nations to
continue expanding and developing economically without compromising the environment. The
most commonly cited definition of sustainable development, produced by the Brundtland
Commission, states, “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
Sustainable development has become uniquely salient within China as large-scale ecological
crises threaten the long term economic growth of cities and the country as a whole become
imminent.
Sustainable development as it relates to the SNWDP has meant a reevaluation of waterwasting activities within the cities, an increase in water reuse capacity, and innovation for new
means of maximizing water resources. This is due to the relatively high cost of SNWDP water
usage. In order to even receive water from the SNWDP, Beijing and Tianjin were both
responsible for fronting the cost of infrastructure to pipe the water through their cities as well as
check for any contamination of the water. Such efforts have simultaneously increased the price
of SNWDP water while also heightening pressure to ensure its conservation.
Since SNWDP implementation in Beijing and Tianjin, agriculture, irrigation, and
industry/manufacturing which use disproportionately large quantities of water have been
expelled from the city in order to both ensure proper use of the SNWDP and development which
incorporates the long-term ecological needs of the municipality. Since 2014, when SNWDP
water was introduced to Tianjin, the city’s cultivated area has been reduced by 35,000 hectares—
a process occurring at the same time as the city’s population grew by over 2 million.43 During
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that same period of time, Beijing’s cultivated land decreased by 64,500 hectares while
population grew by 2.5 million.44
Although the SNWDP has led to a decrease in agricultural land and certain industrial
activities, ample evidence indicates that the SNWDP has had a net positive economic impact.
One research paper, compiled by a professor at Tsinghua University showed that the SNWDP
and the increased urban water supply brought Beijing direct economic benefits of RMB 56
billion (8.6 billion USD), and comprehensive economic benefits of RMB 231.86 billion (35.85
billion USD) by 2013. Using economic modeling, this same paper predicted that, by 2020, direct
economic benefits to Beijing would be RMB 38.72 billion and comprehensive economic benefits
RMB 207.04 billion.45 These predictions, according to the statements by Beijing sources, have
proven accurate, and economic benefits continue to be a widely cited success of the SNWDP.
In Tianjin, similarly, the guarantee of an extra source of water has allowed for increased
urban productivity. Prior to the SNWDP, Tianjin depended almost entirely on water diversion
from the Luanhe River. Much like groundwater reserves, however, due to long-term over
extraction, the Luanhe water diversion was becoming increasingly vulnerable to falling water
levels. Periods of drought which affected the Luanhe River, thus left areas of Tianjin and large
areas of economic activity vulnerable to water shortage.46
In multiple instances, the economic growth of Tianjin, enabled by the ready supply of
SNWDP water, was linked to the political goal of the “Five Modernizations of Tianjin.” The
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Five Modernizations of Tianjin refers to comprehensive, high-quality, innovation-based
development, and construction of a “modern socialist metropolis.” This is achieved through
continued economic advancement, strengthening the rule of law, and advancing science and
technology, among other things. The SNWDP, through its ability to safeguard urban water usage
and promote sustainable economic development, is intimately tied to this policy goal.47

Environmental Benefits
Environmental benefits to Beijing and Tianjin as a result of the SNWDP are far-reaching.
However, the two most commonly cited examples are groundwater restoration and replenishing
of depleted rivers and lakes. These benefits are easily identifiable and thus appear frequently
within official sources celebrating the many accomplishments of the SNWDP.
Both the Beijing and Tianjin Statistical yearbooks show steadily rising groundwater
resources over the period between 2001 and 2018. During this time, groundwater usage fell,
allowing for increasing groundwater levels after decades of intense extraction. The Beijing
Water Affairs Bureau announced that between the beginning of June and the end of July,
groundwater reserves had increased by 180 million cubic meters, and groundwater levels rose
throughout the city by an average of .36 meters.48 In 2015, Beijing’s groundwater levels rose for
the first time since 1999, and have risen 1.2 meters since SNWDP implementation in 2014.49
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Tianjin has also been able to replenish severely depleted groundwater as a result of the
SNWDP. Although groundwater remains depleted, Tianjin has implemented a number of
groundwater protection measures to quickly and effectively restore groundwater levels. In
following the “Overall Plan for Groundwater Pressure Extraction in the Receiving Area of the
East Middle Route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project,” recommended in August of
2014, the Tianjin municipal government approved the “Tianjin City Groundwater Pressure
Extraction Plan.” The Tianjin municipal government also issued a series of notices prohibiting
groundwater extraction in certain areas while also requiring stricter management of
groundwater. Since the advent of the SNWDP and these groundwater protection policies, Tianjin
has accelerated the groundwater replenishment of the Binhai Area and four other districts around
the city.50 As of 2018, the ground water level in Tianjin had increased 38 percent since the
beginning of the SNWDP in 2014.51
Ecological benefits of the SNWDP in Beijing and Tianjin, however, do not end with
policies to stop over extraction of water resources. Since receiving water from the south, both
Beijing and Tianjin have prioritized using portions of SNWDP waters for replenishment of local
rivers and lakes. Throughout North China, along the route of the SNWDP middle line, more than
950 million cubic meters of water has been injected into rivers. Not only has this restored
depleted rivers, but it has also revived marine ecosystems and improved water quality.52 Whereas
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in 2001 only 30 million cubic meters of water were used for ecological restoration, by 2018 that
figure had risen to 1.3 billion cubic meters.
The eastern route of the SNWDP has utilized over 280 million cubic meters of water for
ecological restoration. Major recipients of this water from the eastern route are Nansi Lake,
Dongping Lake and Weishan lake. The mid-line project, similarly, has supplied 4.96 billion
cubic meters of ecological water to 47 rivers in the receiving area, including the Hutuo River, the
Fuyang River, and the Nanjuma River.53 Strengthening these local water sources is crucially
important for long-term water security in Beijing and Tianjin, as these bodies of water provide
water storage capacity for use during periods of drought.

Social Benefits
The social benefits of the use of the SNWDP in Beijing and Tianjin overlap heavily with
economic and environmental benefits. The SNWDP’s ability to promote sustainable
development and ensure water security for businesses, industries and individuals also contributes
to very tangible social benefits. Furthermore, the SNWDP’s ability to stabilize groundwater
extraction and replenish local rivers and streams results in social benefits through ecological
restoration and beautification of marine ecosystems.
An obvious social benefits of the SNWDP for citizens of Beijing and Tianjin, also with
foundations in economic and environmental benefits, is the improved quality of water. As a
result of rigorous attention to polluting activities in the source area, along the route, and within
the receiving area of the SNWDP water, the average water quality in Beijing and Tianjin has
greatly improved. The water quality of 95 percent of Danjiangkou Reservoir, the source of the
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middle line, is Class I water, and the water quality of the middle line has been better than Class II
standard for many years.54 SNWDP water in both Tianjin and Beijing is typically reported as
Type II, though continued efforts at purification aim to raise this average to Type I.
In 2014, a national order affecting both Beijing and Tianjin was issued by the State
Council titled “Regulations on Water Supply Management of the South-to-North Water
Diversion Project.” In this order, The State Council prohibited a number of potentially polluting
activities along the route of the SNWDP while also creating a line of authority for managing
future water quality monitoring. Construction projects, livestock farming, and the dumping of
sewage were banned while constant monitoring of key water pollutant discharging was
adopted.55 As a result of such policies, the water of the SNWDP has been maintained above the
surface water environmental quality standard II.
Much as in the social benefits framing of overall SNWDP official reporting, the number
of beneficiaries is frequently cited. Articles from both Tianjin and Beijing publications explicitly
state the number of beneficiaries with titles such as, “More than 120 million people have directly
benefited from the SNWDP,” published by the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. In
contrast to framing of the SNWDP as a whole, however, the social benefits of Beijing and
Tianjin are routinely tied to social benefits of water source areas through monetary and
infrastructure investment in source area economies. These appeals to southern water source
communities are overtly nationalistic in their emphasis on the importance of the unity of the
China as a whole.
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In one article which simultaneously celebrates the anniversary of SNWDP in Beijing and
Beijing’s investment in water source area projects, the entry of southern water into Beijing is
imaged as connecting the hearts of distant Chinese citizens. “Since the beginning of cooperation
in 2014,” the article states, “Beijing has allocated 3.2 billion yuan to implement more than 900
projects, focusing on supporting the economic and social development of water source areas in
areas such as water quality protection, targeted poverty alleviation, industrial transformation,
people’s livelihood, exchanges and cooperation.”56 It goes on to speak specifically of Shiyan
City, Hubei, the water source area of the SNWDP Middle Route. Known as the “North China
Well,” Shiyan City has been the recipient of large scale investment by Beijing. According to the
article, Beijing has invested more than 200 million yuan to help more than 20 rural villages
develop niche industries, affecting more than 20,000 impoverished people. The deputy mayor of
Shiyan City, Wu Ye, is quoted as saying that his city will work diligently to guard the North
China Well in gratitude for the contributions of Beijing.
Tianjin has undertaken similar initiatives, as exemplified by an article published in April
2020 by the Tianjin Municipal People’s Government, “1.62 billion yuan in Tianjin-Shaanxi
cooperation funds to support 286 key projects.” The article states that these initiatives initiated
and funded by Tianjin include primarily ecological restoration projects which are directly linked
to the SNWDP’s water quality, but also focus on social development of source area
communities. Teaching facilities and medical facilities that seek to improve the livelihood and
welfare of Shaanxi citizens have clear social benefits. This framing, thus, attempts to conjoin the
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social benefits of the source and receiving areas by making the case that source areas are not
being exploited for the benefit of northern cities.57

Conclusion
Beijing and Tianjin have each benefited greatly from the water of the SNWDP.
Economically, the SNWDP has provided higher levels of water security to businesses,
individuals, and industries. Environmentally, the SNWDP has been used to replenish depleted
rivers and lakes and halt overexploitation of groundwater. Socially, the SNWDP has improved
water quality and the health of local residents, while also incentivizing investment from Beijing
and Tianjin to improve the living conditions of source area communities.
However, it is not merely Beijing and Tianjin municipalities or source area communities
which are the recipient of monetary investment that have benefited from the success of the
SNWDP. The state itself, which has recommended, approved, initiated, and maintained the
SNWDP also benefits from the perceived and projected success of the SNWDP in these cities.
Despite the SNWDP’s inability to “solve” the water issues of Northern China, the central
government appears to be making the case that successes in Beijing and Tianjin, cities
recognized internationally for the inadequacy of their water resources, justify the project and
provide examples of the SNWDP at its best.
By alleviating the water scarcity of internationally recognized cities, China serves to
project the message of its commitment to environmental restoration not only to its citizens, but to
the international community as well. Judith Shapiro and Li Yifei, in their book China Goes
Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet, understand this environmental
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posturing to the international community as a pivotal component of authoritarian
environmentalism and its coopting of the environmental movement.58 This framing, in its
alignment with nationalism and modernization, thus intimately serves to bolster the legitimacy of
the party state while projecting China’s “commitment” to international efforts to protect the
planet.
The framing of Beijing and Tianjin is also decidedly utilitarian, as it advances the
narrative that the project is justifiable for its ability to economically, environmentally, and
socially benefit the millions of residents of the two cities. Despite the project’s high costs and
environmental impact on source area water ways, the benefits expected for Beijing and Tianjin
residents outweigh such concerns.
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Chapter IV- Public Perception of the South to North Water Diversion Project
The previous chapters of this thesis have focused on how the State has framed the
SNWDP, and the political, economic, and environmental motivations which have guided that
framing. This chapter builds upon such framing analysis by unpacking how Chinese netizens
discuss and frame the SNWDP on the online platform, Zhihu.
The internet was first connected in China in 1994. Throughout the Western world
scholars and casual observers alike were quick to predict that the introduction of the internet and
its ability to connect and amplify citizen voices spelled the end of CCP authority.59 However, the
reality of the effects of internet usage upon the CCP’s hold on power as well as the social and
political identities of Chinese citizens is much more complex.
As of March 2020, China’s population of internet users, rested at 903 million, nearly
doubling since 2010.60 The growth of internet users, often referred to as “netizens,” has
paralleled the growth of an extensive Chinese internet industry. Platforms such as Weibo,
WeChat, QQ, Douban, Tianya, and Zhihu are some of the largest social media platforms in the
world. In 2018, WeChat, a messaging platform, surpassed 1 billion users, and by 2020 had
grown to 1.2 billion. QQ, another messaging platform, boasted 648 million users by 2020.
Weibo, a microblogging platform often compared to Twitter, currently has a user base of 523
million.61 These statistics show Chinese social media usership in the hundreds of millions, or in
the case of WeChat, the billions, indicating that internet usage in China is no longer an exclusive
pastime of the urban, educated, or wealthy.
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Despite, or perhaps because of such widespread access to and usage of the internet, CCP
authority has held firm. An array of scholarly literature has been produced which seeks to
explain this paradox by analyzing Chinese citizens’ internet usage habits and government
responses to that usage. This area of research has effectively broken down the false dichotomy of
digital activism versus online censorship by explaining the nuances that exist within Chinese
cyberspace.
Although the expansion of internet usage among Chinese citizens has not effectively
challenged authoritarianism, it has gradually opened up new spaces for Chinese citizens to
express opinions despite government censorship. The Great Firewall, which bans most
mainstream Western internet and social media platforms and certain sensitive political topics
from Chinese internet users, does little to prohibit Chinese citizens from using the internet to
criticize government actions, propose remedies to social issues, or even mobilize for offline
protests. “State power,” writes Guobin Yang, a pioneer of research on the rise and effects of the
internet in China, “constrains the forms and issues of contention, but instead of preventing it
from happening, it forces activists to be more creative and artful.”62 Chinese online activists have
perfected the ability to operate within, though on the edges of, legal and acceptable online
behavior, gradually prying open the CCP’s monopoly on information and control of public
opinion.
Internet activism, however, cannot be solely understood as a battle between citizens for
open access to information and the state for control of that information. The rapid expansion of
internet usage in China has also been used as a tool to deepen and reinforce CCP control. For
example, the Communist Party has in recent years perfected its e-government strategy which
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allows citizens to use official party websites to lodge complaints and make suggestions. These
online forums are often seen as a “safety valve” which allow citizens to speak frankly about their
frustrations and feel as if those frustrations are heard, thereby reaffirm the legitimacy of the
state.63 This has become important in allowing citizens to vocalize environmental grievances,
particularly air and water pollution.
Another way in which the CCP has been able to utilize the internet for its own gain is
through what is known colloquially as the “Fifty-Cent Army.” These online commentators are
employed by the CCP to promote a pro-government discourse within online discussions, and are
believed to be paid ¥0.50 per post, resulting in their moniker. Such individuals are, with varying
degrees of success, able to move online conversations in directions that promote the party-state’s
authority and curtail anti-government sentiment.64 The internet, viewed from this light, has thus
served as an additional, highly-trafficked platform for propaganda.
Regardless of whether the internet is used to promote or subvert CCP authority, it has
without a doubt raised new questions regarding governance, communication, and knowledge
acquisition, and its impact is unlikely to diminish anytime in the near or distant future.
Conversely, internet usage in China is predicted to grow by over 200 million by 2025.65 This
situation necessitates creative solutions by both the Chinese state and its citizens. This chapter
seeks to shed light upon the online discourses employed in discussions surrounding China’s
SNWDP. I argue that the framing devices employed by the state have proved effective in shaping
public opinion as observed through Zhihu discussion. Although online commentary is not devoid
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of criticism, indicating that such topics are open to discussion, most online users are sympathetic
to the project, and often overtly echo the phrasing of official sources.
Zhihu was chosen as the platform of analysis for gauging public opinion due to its
function as a question-and-answer platform where Chinese citizens are able to discuss their
thoughts on topics of interest. Users follow “threads” related to certain concepts and “like” the
questions and responses which they agree with. Questions and responses with the most likes will
be pushed to the top of users’ feeds. As of 2018, Zhihu membership had surpassed 220 million,
making it one of China’s most heavily trafficked social media platforms, with over 30 million
questions and 130 million answers.66 Topics discussed on Zhihu can range from light-hearted
discussion of pop culture to analysis of weighty political, social, and economic issues.
Although Zhihu exists as a space for debate, there are certainly limits to what may be
discussed on any internet platform. Comments which include phrases such as “corrupt
government” or “corrupt politicians” or which discuss highly sensitive political topics (Xinjiang,
Tibet, or Taiwanese Independence) are likely to be taken down. Despite such censorship, Zhihu
has remained a lively platform for Chinese netizens to learn about the different perspectives
surrounding politics, culture, economics, and the South to North Water Diversion Project
(SNWDP).
As of 2020, the SNWDP had been discussed on Zhihu 2,598 times, meaning there are
questions from 2,598 individuals, each with its own set of responses (and responses to those
responses) discussing the effects and implications of the SNWDP. In order to use these postings
to observe the most widely-held views in regards to the SNWDP, I have chosen the twenty-five
most trafficked posts.
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Taking these twenty-five posts, I have created two categories of analysis. The first
category of discussions is made up of those that address the shortcomings of the SNWDP.
Within this category I identify and analyze the most commonly stated reasons for concern within
Zhihu postings discussing the water transfer project. The second category of question and
comments focus on the more common postings among Zhihu users which reaffirm the stated,
observed, or expected benefits of the SNWDP. Within this category I focus on the reoccurring
frames supporting the building and maintenance of the SNWDP.

Addressing Shortcomings
Although the majority of Zhihu commentary related to the SNWDP views the project
sympathetically, there remains significant doubts regarding the project. By far the most
commonly identified critical comment related to the SNWDP is that the project, despite its cost
and construction time, has not yet achieved the results it promised.
As noted in the previous chapter on official framing, the SNWDP has been repeatedly
promoted, especially in recent years, as an environmental project which will significantly aid
Northern water scarcity and allow for more sustained economic growth. Yet, many netizens
remain skeptical of this framing’s accuracy. One question, which received thirty answers and
was browsed by 197,000 accounts asks, “Can the South to North Water Diversion Project
Improve the Uneven Distribution of Water Resources in the North and South?” The most liked
response to this question, with 572 likes, begins with the sentence, “My opinion is that it can, but
its ability is limited.” Without the completion of the western line, he says, the water is mainly
delivered to Northwest China and even then, it is concentrated only within certain areas (Beijing,
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Tianjin, Hebei). Furthermore, water is only being pulled from a few sections of the Yangtze,
which is not enough to solve the major flooding issues in the South.
This dilemma of how to evaluate the utility of the SNWDP as a whole comes up again in
a question which asks “Was the South to North Water Diversion Project a Failure? If Not, How
Should the Results be Evaluated?” The most popular answer to this question states, “In the short
term, the South-to-North Water Diversion Project has helped alleviate the urgent need for water
in northern China.” He follows this, however, by listing five major long-term shortcomings of
the project. He states that saving water and preventing pollution should have preceded water
diversion, diverting water to Beijing has been inappropriately prioritized, and ecological damage
to the source area and the effects of climate change have been ignored. He concludes that
projects which made full use of the laws of nature were beneficial for thousands of years. He
hopes that the SNWDP will be among them, but worries that his hope is misplaced.
Uncertainty and disappointment in the overall assessment of the SNWDP is the most
commonly observed grievance among Zhihu postings. Dissatisfaction ranges from the previous
instances of hope for future improvement to outright anger. Two points in particular, forced
migration and negative environmental and economic impacts in the source area, galvanized the
most emotional responses by Zhihu bloggers. Importantly, both issues involve the
disproportionate impact of the project for those living along source area waterways.
Blogging about forced migration relies on highly personal migrant stories in order to
relay their individual tragedies. One question asks “What do you know about the relocation of
immigrants because of the South to North Water Transfer Project?” The most popular response,
instead of answering the question, tells the story of Wu Degong a man from Henan Province who
was relocated on three separate occasions by the state. He was forced to move when the
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Danjiangkou reservoir was built in 1966 and yet again for the construction of the middle route in
2004. His life story of poverty and constant uncertainty as a result of the state’s actions is meant
to evoke emotion and impossible to read without both sympathy for others in his situation and
disdain for the state which subjected him to such treatment.
A second, highly trafficked Zhihu post detailing the struggles of SNWDP-induced
migration is not a question, but instead a long-form essay published by the True Story Project.
The True Story Project is a platform that was created to share the everyday struggles of Chinese
citizens through social media. The story is titled “Corruption, Straining, and the Relocation of
Unregistered Households: The Past of Migrants in the South to North Water Diversion
Reservoir.” As the title suggests, it takes a much more negative look at the migration which
China’s decades of development have caused by telling the story of a group of migrants who
have all been economically and psychologically impacted by forced immigration. On this post,
more so than any other examined for this research, the presence of censorship was undeniable.
Although the story only accumulated around one hundred likes, the comment section showed a
number of “deleted” and “removed” posts. However, one particularly emphatic posting escaped
deletion despite its pointed rhetoric:

“I am quite opposed to this practice of sacrificing personal interests for the country. I
think this should not happen in a democratic and strong country. Personal interests should
be given priority. The purpose of social development is to protect the interests of
hundreds of millions. Relying on the sacrifice of the individual to meet the needs of the
ruling party itself violates the basic principles of law”

46

Although the estimated 200,000 migrants created as a result of the SNWDP may seem
minimal in relation to China’s population of 1.4 billion, this process is clearly an issue with deep
significance for Chinese citizens who feel that forced migration is an exhausting, demoralizing,
and unfair ordeal. Furthermore, the deleted comments under the True Story Project posting seem
to indicate that this is an issue which Zhihu is inclined to censor.
Unfortunately, water source communities are not impacted by the SNWDP solely through
forced migration. There is a large body of evidence which supports the idea that the SNWDP
will damage southern waterways and marine ecosystems. In addition, in order to prevent
pollution in the middle line, a number of potentially polluting activities which had previously
served as the economic backbone within and along the Danjiangkou reservoir have been
prohibited. Both of these situations, combined with the fact that source area regions are not
situated to benefit from the SNWDP, has created a tense situation.
Another subject of discussion which sparks equal amounts pointed questions and angry
responses is the topic of desalination. This process, though it has become a major source of water
for many water-scarce countries in the Middle East, remains controversial for large scale usage
in China because of the large amount of energy which is required, and the hazardous brine which
is produced. Despite the drawbacks to desalination, many individuals feel that China has
neglected developing the technology, instead settling on the equally expensive and
environmentally destructive SNWDP.
Questions related to desalination within the top twenty-five most trafficked SNWDP
Zhihu posts are “Why can’t seawater desalination work with the same huge sums devoted to the
South-to-North Water Diversion?”, “Why can’t we extract fresh water from seawater to solve the
problem of water scarcity in big cities (such as Beijing)? And Is the South-to-North Water
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Diversion necessary because of the high cost?” and “Why would you prefer to transfer water
from the south to the north instead of using desalination?”
The discussion within the comments of the question “Why can’t we extract fresh water
from seawater to solve the problem of water scarcity in big cities (such as Beijing)?” are
skeptical of the wisdom of pursuing the SNWDP over desalination. The top answer to this
question argues that the prospect of seawater desalination for places like Beijing and Tianjin is
better than that of the SNWDP. The high cost of desalination, he believes, will still be lower than
water delivery by the SNWDP after the full costs of forced migration, reservoir expansion,
maintenance, etc. are included. The reason why the SNWDP was chosen over desalination was
an underestimation of the cost of the SNWDP when it was first planned, as well as the
decreasing cost of desalination as technology has improved. Later answers agree with this
sentiment, however, it must be acknowledged that these cost estimates apply only to Beijing and
Tianjin, and not to some of the more remote, landlocked municipalities which currently benefit
from the SNWDP.

Reaffirming Benefits
Before beginning the discussion of how Zhihu commentary most often affirms the
project, I would like to begin by giving separate emphasis to the most circulated question on the
topic of the SNWDP. Due to the high level of engagement with this question, the overarching
nature of its subject matter, as well as the unique perspectives within its comment section, I
believe this posting deserves specific examination.
The most circulated question, browsed by over 2,800,000 individual accounts, poses the
question “From a historic perspective, to what extent can the SNWDP affect China?” This
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question was liked 26,000 times, with 1723 individuals commenting their opinion. The most
upvoted comment, which was liked 840 times, and prompted 96 comments of its own, was
posted on December 22, 2019, by a user named Ai Liyan. In his post, I identified three major
themes regarding the SNWDP.
The first and most obvious theme throughout this post is Ai Liyan’s belief in the
importance of the collective use of China’s resources, and thus that it is completely fair that each
region shares its resources with less endowed areas. This point is no doubt in response to the
criticism that the SNWDP disproportionately damages southern, water-source areas, while the
water goes primarily to northern cities. To this, he says coal is transported to the South from the
North and that gas is transported from the West to the East. Thus, although he concedes that
negative impacts are disproportionately felt in the South, it is still the South’s duty to give to the
North for the benefit of the nation. This point clearly echoes the nationalist sentiment found
within official framing of the SNWDP.
The second theme, closely related to the first, is the emphasis on the poor resource
allocation in China and the resulting ecological crisis which China faces. He states that resource
allocation in China is woefully uneven, with 340 million people in the North receiving only 10
percent of water resources. This point, he believes, necessitates the construction of the SNWDP
so that citizens of the North can live comfortably and contribute to production. This point falls in
line with previously identified emphasis on Northern water scarcity by the state.
The third and final theme is his acceptance of the SNWDP despite his characterization of
it as a short-term, somewhat ineffective project. In the first point he makes in the post, he
encourages the reader not to overestimate the impact of the SNWDP. Due to current limits in
engineering, the SNWDP cannot be expected to alleviate all of China’s water scarcity problems
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on an individual level. He also says that the SNWDP will likely only operate for about 100 years
before it is replaced. However, this point is not framed as backlash against the SNWDP. He says
the project is more complicated than simple gains and losses and to reduce it to such is to put
oneself basically at the level of a grocery store owner (Záhuò pù diànzhǔ de shuǐpíng).
All in all, this perspective is one of approval for the building and maintenance of the
SNWDP. Although the author acknowledges some of the drawbacks of the SNWDP, he
ultimately ignores them in favor of the project’s ability to improve the ecological state of the
nation. This posting and the degree of favor it garnered seems to indicate that public opinion of
the SNWDP—despite its very significant shortcomings and very localized benefits—has
remained largely positive. The shortcomings such as high costs, short term benefits, can be
rationalized through appeals to nationalism, economic growth, and environmental restoration,
and through a utilitarian view of the project’s benefits.
This pattern of minimizing the SNWDP’s shortcomings due to its ability to bring much
needed water to the North, a pattern acutely observed in the state framing of the project, is a
constant theme of Zhihu commentary regarding the project. The frequency of positive framing in
discussions of the SNWDP on Zhihu indicates that identifying and emphasizing the strengths of
the SNWDP is not an onerous undertaking for many Chinese citizens. The project, despite the
controversy it has brought, has been perceived as highly beneficial in relieving over-reliance on
groundwater and increasing the security of access to clean municipal water in certain areas.
These positive effects are most easily observed and, as a result, most frequently discussed in the
contexts of localized benefits felt within specific areas. In the case of the 25 discussion posts
analyzed for this analysis, that locality of emphasis was most often Beijing.
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Two questions in particular, “The Middle Route and East Route of the South-to-North
Water Diversion Project have been put into use. What is the effect?” and “After the opening of
the South-to-North Water Transfer Project, what impact will it have on Beijing’s tap water
supply? What improvements did it bring?” initiated lengthy discussions of the significant
beneficial effects of the SNWDP in Beijing, and praise for the project as a whole.
The responses to the aforementioned questions pointed out that since the SNWDP,
groundwater in Beijing has been replenished, the trend of land subsidence has eased, the water
quality has improved, and local rivers and reservoirs are able to be replenished. These impacts
have had far-reaching economic, environmental, and social benefits for the residents of Beijing, a
point of praise within discussions of the project. In this discussion post, we are able to see just
how effective the state’s framing has been, especially for localized benefits. Beijing as well as
the national government have worked to present Beijing as a model city of the SNWDP’s
positive effect, and Zhihu commentary has validated this.
It would seem to follow, given the SNWDP’s emphasis on aiding Beijing, that
discussions would regard such a hierarchy of water target areas as unfair, however, Zhihu users
are quick to point out that the SNWDP, as much as it may aid Beijing, is a project with dispersed
benefits. In one question, cleverly titled “Is it more appropriate to rename the South-to-North
Water Transfer Project the South-to-Beijing Water Transfer Project,” the most popular answer
lists paragraphs of data conveying the SNWDP’s role in aiding numerous cities and villages
along with pointing out the comparatively minimal water quantity which is delivered to Beijing.
This emphasis upon the wide-spread benefits of the SNWDP represents another major
point of approval within Zhihu discussion. In discussing the question “Is the “South-to-North
Water Diversion” really necessary? What are the pros and cons?” respondents came passionately
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to the defense of the project. The most popular comment stated “The South-to-North Water
Diversion is of great significance to the improvement of drinking water for residents along the
route and the restoration of groundwater levels.” By including the phrase “along the route,” this
respondent clearly emphasizes water delivery to persons and places not specifically urban.
Another comment on the same post says that the SNWDP has positively impacted “the overall
living standards of the farmers in our hometown,” further emphasizing a nonurban place of water
transport and a nonurban individual beneficiary.
Although a majority of the comments supporting the building and maintenance of the
SNWDP relate to the people, places, and ecosystems which stand to benefit from an additional
source of fresh water, one highly-supported comment takes a different approach to the benefits
of the SNWDP by rejecting adherence to the often unsustainable, unrealistic expectations for the
project. The comment follows from the question, “Is it possible in the future to use the transfer of
water from the South to the North to improve the local geology to form a large oasis and largescale industrial agriculture?” The author of the question follows with his belief that such a
process would also help prevent flooding in the south and better maximize usage of Chinese
land.
In answer to this, comes one of the most straight-forward appeals to a sustainability
mindset found within the top twenty-five Zhihu discussions of the SNWDP. The respondent
starts by saying “It is 2020, why is there still someone thinking about destroying the desert all
day.” They then explain the many positive benefits associated with desert ecosystems,
concluding that seeking to eradicate the desert by bringing in Southern water would have the
same ecological effects as “cutting down the trees and grasses of the Loess Plateau, the trees of
the Hengduan Mountains, and the grasses of the Hunlunbuir,” examples of actions which have
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had devastating effects on the Chinese natural landscape. Viewed in this light, the SNWDP
which merely transports water from a few source areas to a few receiving areas is perhaps
sustainable, as it extends, but does not overreach the bounds of nature.

Conclusion
This chapter has listed many of the themes occurring within discussions of the South to
North Water Diversion Project by everyday Chinese citizens. Although the perspectives range
widely, there are undertones and reoccurring points which weave through vastly different
arguments and lend understanding to a cohesive view of the SNWDP. This is not to say that
Chinese citizens have collectively come to understand the SNWDP in a singular light, but rather
that the frequency of certain frames has permeated arguments consistently enough to point out
some of the major aspects of public opinion on the SNWDP.
The first undertone worthy of mentioning is the acceptance of the SNWDP as an
expenditure of state money and as an approach to alleviating Northern water scarcity despite
what many are quick to label as an inadequate solution. This acceptance is observed first,
through the structure of discussions in which if a question is posed pointing out a shortcoming of
the project, a flurry of comments will come to its defense. Similarly, if in response to a question,
a negative comment is asserted, the comments spinning off of that comment are often in favor of
the project. Lastly, it is often the case that a comment critical of the project is either preceded or
followed by that same individual tempering their words with an understanding of the ways in
which it has been beneficial.
This acceptance of the project despite the inadequacy of its results is frequently coupled
with the affirmation of the extreme water scarcity in Northern China. In none of the Zhihu
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discussions analyzed for this research were there comments diminishing the current water crisis
faced in Northern China. Criticism, when it occurred, stemmed from acknowledgment of the
shortcomings of SNWDP or belief that other alternatives (desalination, water saving, pollution
reversing) should have been pursued more fully.
In short, the Zhihu posts analyzed within this chapter point to a public perception of the
SNWDP that conforms to the state rhetoric analyzed in preceding chapters. Despite the wellreported negative impacts of the project, its benefits are much more prevalent within online
discourse. Perhaps, in the international and domestic uproar surrounding the Three Gorges Dam,
in which dissidents were jailed and an unprecedented number of representatives to the People’s
Congress abstained from voting on the issue, the party state has learned how to prevent such a
crisis from boiling over again. Its strategy lies in calculated framing which presents the project as
beneficial to a large number and diverse set of people, while serving as a harbinger for further
economic and sustainable development for the nation.
The efficacy of state framing of the SNWDP, however, points to a further dilemma—
what is lost when utilitarian state framing goes so far as to eradicate large-scale dissent? One
answer lies in the resumption of the “conquer nature” mindset among Chinese citizens and policy
makers, a mindset often associated with the Maoist Era.67 Despite the rhetoric of sustainability
which cloaks official discourse and online discussions, both leaders and citizens retain a desire
for innovation to weaken nature’s natural barriers to human encroachment. Within Zhihu
discussions, netizens are more often disappointed that the project could not solve Northern water
scarcity than with the fact that such an option was chosen over more gradual, long-term
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solutions. As a result, although the CCP may have won the battle of peacefully implementing the
world’s largest inter-basin water transfer project, it remains to be seen whether they will be
victorious in the war of awakening to the existential threat of resource depletion and
environmental degradation which currently plagues the country.
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Conclusion
This thesis finds that the state takes into account potential dissent and an emerging
environmental civil society by adopting framing strategies which produce a modicum of consent
for its policy decisions. Though this pattern of state conduct is likely pervasive within CCP
policies, examining framing strategies through the case study of the SNWDP provides a
particularly salient window into this pattern of state behavior.
First and foremost, the SNWDP is an important case study due to the sheer severity of the
water-related issues which it was constructed to combat. In mainland China, pollution,
groundwater depletion, and the drying of rivers and lakes have compounded to make China one
of the world’s most water insecure nations in the world.
Second, the SNWDP is an important case study due to the population density within
water-scarce areas which it serves. Over 100 million people live within the Yellow River basin
alone. This demographic feature makes addressing water security in this area critical to the
continued economic, political, and social stability of the PRC. Failing to do so would affect the
livelihoods of millions of people.
Third and finally, the SNWDP is an important case study due to its massive scale and
array of negative effects. The SNWDP, when it is fully operational will be the largest inter-basin
water transfer project ever completed. However, such construction comes at the cost of the
creation of 300,000 migrants in the Danjiangkou reservoir region, degradation of water quality
and quantity in the Yangtze source area, pollution of waters within the canals of the SNWDP,
and $79 billion USD.
Through analysis of the framing surrounding the SNWDP and its impact on online
discourse, this thesis finds that, despite the negative impacts of the project, the state’s framing
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has been largely effective in swaying public perception toward understanding the project as a
positive development. Official sources rely on nationalism, rooted in an emphasis on the unity of
the state as a collective whole, the importance of Beijing as an internationally recognized city
and national capital, and Xi Jinping’s developmental “China Dream” to present the project as an
important economic and environmental infrastructure project. Such appeals to nationalism are
also tied to utilitarian framing which tacitly presents the hundreds of millions of beneficiaries as
much more significant than the few millions of individuals negatively impacted. Such top-down
policymaking allows the state to decisively direct environmental policy and, as this thesis argues,
the ways in which it is framed and perceived.
It appears that the Chinese state has learned a great deal since the early 1990s and the
controversy over the Three Gorges Dam, which shares a number of similarities with the
SNWDP. Both projects are large-scale undertakings by the national government in order to alter
the natural environment and promote the economic development of the state. Both forced the
relocation of a large number of local residents, and both cost the state billions of dollars.
Despite the similarities of the projects and the emerging environmental movement, the
SNWDP has not galvanized the same backlash as the Three Gorges Dam. This paradox points to
an authoritarian state with unexpected flexibility. China has found that, rather than jailing
dissidents and barring discussion, allowing critical discussion to occur while aligning potentially
unsatisfactory policy with national goals of economic development, nationalism and
environmentalism has been more effective in controlling discourse and promoting approval. The
state has thus coopted the public’s desires for economic and environmental improvement by
presenting itself as in line with these policy goals. As a result, the state leaves no meaningful
room for objection and maintains its continued legitimacy.
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The SNWDP confirms what Judith Shapiro and Li Yifei identify as a pattern of
authoritarian environmentalism within Chinese policy making and framing. China has used the
project and its promise of stable water resources to stoke nationalism, project its scientific and
technological prowess, and align itself with the international and domestic environmental
movement. The state has found such framing effective in shaping public perception and online
discourse, thus, it is safe to assume that such framing devices will reemerge to justify future
Chinese megaprojects.
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